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OPERATIONAL PLAN

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I. CASING OF DROP SITE

It is proposed that we brief [redacted] immediately, instructing him to case this area thoroughly. It is envisioned that [redacted] should first stroll past the drop site for external observations, and later, at an interval of several days, enter the site area and place a telephone call to a pre-arranged contact or absented Embassy acquaintance--whose absence has been previously ascertained. (See Annex I for detailed casing brief for [redacted] guidance.)

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II. CASING OF SIGNAL SITE

After a thorough casing and examination of the proposed dead drop site, [redacted] should case the signal site proposed by [redacted]. This casing can be done simultaneously with the casing of the dead drop site since it is believed that it is unnecessary to physically enter the signal site proper. In fact, the undersigned urges that [redacted] not enter the signal site area (to use the phone) for security reasons. A passing, external inspection should be sufficient. (See Annex III for signal site brief for [redacted] guidance.)

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III. INTERNAL COMMUNICATION WITH [redacted]

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A. Loading Pre-selected Drop

1. Upon receipt of [redacted] detailed casing information regarding site characteristics and [redacted] determination of [redacted] date of arrival in Helsinki, it is proposed that CSR/9 and/or the undersigned (or CSR/9's designee(s)) proceed to Helsinki for the purpose of briefing and further training [redacted] to put down the pre-selected drop. The actual drop will consist of acknowledgement of [redacted] first communication and a detailed plan designed to enable [redacted] to deposit additional materials in a drop selected and affording maximal control by CIA. (See outgoing communications from [redacted])

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*See Annex II for [redacted] background.

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2. The drop packet and contents will be prepared at Headquarters and should be hermetically sealed (to deter opening by [REDACTED] as well as to protect the contents) and colored to match the dark green radiator drop site. CSR/9 will hand-carry the packet to Helsinki for transmittal to [REDACTED]

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3. In Helsinki, [REDACTED] will be given intensive briefing on the general and specific locale, avenue(s) of approach, loading, security factors, aborting measures, possible entrapment including KGB M. O. against [REDACTED] if apprehended, use of telephone to call wife, exiting direction, and signalling technique and procedure. To give realism to the briefing, a building with foyer area, similar to the actual drop site, will attempted to be found in the Helsinki area and actual practice(s) will be performed.

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4. [REDACTED] will then be given the packet to secrete upon himself as he returns to Moscow. (Note: [REDACTED] has a diplomatic passport and has previously reported that he has never been searched or asked to declare his personal items to Customs.) Upon arrival in Moscow, [REDACTED] will transfer the packet to his maximum security safe to which he alone has the key and combination. The safe is located in a secure building. (If preferred, the packet could be retained upon his body until the drop is effected.)

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5. As soon as possible, [REDACTED] will make a dry run up Pushkinskaya Ulitsa for the purpose of external casing and orientation of the building drop site. At an interval of several days, he will make the actual drop preferably just before dusk, late in the day. It is suggested that consideration be given to [REDACTED] proceeding along Kuznetskiy Most, turning abruptly right onto Pushkinskaya Ulitsa, and, at his normal (fast) pace, proceeding directly into the drop site locale and emplacing the drop. An alternative method might be to proceed down Kuznetskiy Most and observe the window displays in Meat Store No. 19, turning onto Pushkinskaya Ulitsa, (still window shopping in the Meat Store), pause and then proceed into the building site and place a call to his wife inquiring as to what kind of meat or kolbasa his wife prefers him to purchase. This would give him a convincing cover for the use of the phone, although his surveillants might be closer because he slowed down to window shop.

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6. If, for any reason, [REDACTED] is obliged to abort the actual loading of the drop, then he should make, at this time, only one more attempt at an interval of approximately one week. If a second attempt must be made, [REDACTED] should use the alternate plan for approach and not the exact one as before.

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7. After successful loading of the drop, [REDACTED] should allow at least one day to pass, but not more than two, before he puts down the pre-selected signal at the pre-designated site. On the basis of [REDACTED] casing report, [REDACTED] can proceed to this site and mark the loading signal with a red crayon or pen.

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IV. OUTGOING COMMUNICATION FROM [REDACTED]

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A. It is proposed that in our message to [REDACTED] that we inform him of the following method in which he may communicate with us:

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1. [REDACTED] will be instructed that the American House, No. 3 KROPOTKINSKAYA NABERZHNA YA, will be the locale for the drop. He will be instructed to proceed down the right side of TURCHANIN Ulitsa (toward the Moscow River) at a specified date and time, and as he passes the wall surrounding the American House courtyard, throw the drop package over the wall. [REDACTED] will be in place on the other side of the wall to retrieve the package. (See attached diagram and 1955 photos of this area - Annex IV.)

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2. Upon receipt of package [REDACTED] will secrete it upon himself and return immediately to the Embassy for inclusion of package in pouch. NOTE: Dependent upon the circumstances and [REDACTED] recommendations, it may be more propitious to use the Marine NCO (highly recommended by [REDACTED] for actual transport of the drop packet to the Embassy. Thus, [REDACTED] could leave empty-handed and upon safe-arrival at the Embassy could telephone [REDACTED] at the American House. This would be the signal for [REDACTED] to instruct the Marine NCO to leave for the Embassy. However, such action might not be amenable to [REDACTED] without Ambassadorial knowledge and concurrence.

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3. The afore-mentioned plan is contingent upon [REDACTED] casing of the area and his recommendations for implementing the plan. (A briefing guide is attached as Annex V for [REDACTED] guidance.)

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ANNEX I

1. As soon as possible, [REDACTED] should take a stroll up the right-hand side of PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa (going toward SADOVAYA) and closely observe Building No. 2, situated between the Women's Shoe Store and Meat Store No. 19, located near the intersection of PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa and KUZNETSKIY MOST. (See Attachment No. 1 - map of area.)

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2. During [REDACTED] walk-by and visual inspection of Building No. 2 and the immediate vicinity, the following detailed information is desired:

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- a. What type of building does No. 2 appear to be? Apartment-house, shop, restaurant, warehouse, etc.?
- b. Would a Westerner be able to enter the ground floor to use the telephone without arousing undue attention?
- c. Is the telephone booth visible when walking past the building?
- d. Are there any windows flanking the entrance which would enable passersby to look into the lobby or foyer on the ground floor?
- e. Was the presence of any type of possible fixed security forces noted in the immediate vicinity?
- f. Note surveillance patterns on [REDACTED] in this area and the closeness of [REDACTED] surveillants, if possible (without arousing their suspicions).
- g. Did [REDACTED] note any people transiting (entering or departing) or loitering in the lobby/foyer of Building No. 2 as [REDACTED] passed?
- h. What type of building is located directly across the street from Building No. 2 with respect to its adaptability as an observation post?

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NOTE: To facilitate [REDACTED] ability to observe the numerous items enumerated above, it is suggested that [REDACTED] pause at several stores along PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa to "window shop." In fact,

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██████████ might window shop at the *Кухня* on the corner of PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa and KUZNETSKIY MOST (note location on attached map) and even enter and purchase a book. Upon exiting ██████████ could cross the street and window shop in Meat Store No. 19. With regard to the meat store, CIA would be interested in knowing if there is an entrance on KUZNETSKIY MOST as well as on PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa. Also what are the operating hours of the meat shop?

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3. At an interval of several days, preferably at dusk, ██████████ should walk toward PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa past the PROEZO KHUDOZHESTVENNOGO TEATRA, turn right onto PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa and enter Building No. 2 and place a telephone call (telephone No. 28) to a friend in the Embassy. (This call should be pre-arranged to ██████████ or so arranged that ██████████ will know that the recipient of the call is not present to answer the call.) The location of the telephone is contained in the attached map and is situated to the left of the entrance.

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4. The following detailed information is desired in conjunction with this casing/observation plan:

a. Surveillance: Number and pattern. Did any follow ██████████ into Building No. 2? Is it possible to enter Building No. 2 before the surveillance turns the corner?

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b. Sketch and describe interior of foyer or lobby.

- (1) Are there apt to be people loitering inside?
- (2) Where are the stairs located?
- (3) What color are the walls? Type of floor?
- (4) What type of lighting is used in the lobby? How bright?
- (5) Is phone booth illuminated?
- (6) Note any other entrances or exits.

c. Particularly note dark green radiator near wall, opposite telephone booth, and to right of the entrance.

(1) Match green color as close as possible with colors from your chart. Is finish flat or shiny? New or old? Is it smooth or cracked and peeling.

(2) If [REDACTED] can determine a standard green available in Moscow, and visual observation confirms that this is the same shade of green as the radiator, he may possibly be able to duplicate it from Embassy stocks.

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(3) It may be that the paint inside other Moscow building entrances is similar in color to that of the radiator site. Therefore, [REDACTED] may be able to get a sample, away from the site, after he has observed the radiator coloring.

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(4) How high is radiator off of floor? Length?

(5) Note peculiar or distinguishing characteristics.

(6) What is the approximate distance between wall and back of radiator?

(7) What are the lighting conditions here?

(8) Is the hook visible? What color is the hook?

(9) Would a small packet, the color of the radiator, be visible to people entering or loitering in the foyer/ lobby?

(10) Are there knobs or dials for manual operation of the radiator?

(11) When will central heat be turned on in Moscow?

NOTE: In order to observe radiator area closely, [REDACTED] might, if he deems it secure, loiter just briefly near the radiator before exiting. [REDACTED] could be buttoning his coat, lighting a cigarette, blowing nose, etc.)

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ANNEX II

The utilization of [REDACTED] in the project [REDACTED] presupposes that a risk assessment has been resolved in favor of using [REDACTED] instead of an unprotected American tourist. [REDACTED] The involvement of [REDACTED] also is predicated on the fact that because of the prohibition on the use of American Embassy personnel, no active support can be rendered by CIA staff agents attached to the American Embassy, Moscow. The decision to use the services of [REDACTED] was based on the above premises plus the fact that [REDACTED] has diplomatic immunity, that he is trained in operational support tasks, capable, well motivated, and has already established operational patterns. Moreover, in case of a provocation, no American would be involved directly. On the debit side of the ledger, it should be noted that [REDACTED] is not CIA controlled (joint liaison operation), that he will probably render a full report of his operational involvement to his superiors, that [REDACTED] will become involved in this operation, and that [REDACTED] must be met in Helsinki in order to rehearse all steps of the plan and to give Subject the drop instrument.

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[REDACTED]

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ANNEX III

SIGNAL SITE CASING

1. Approach from Ulitsa GORKOGO going toward Ulitsa PUSHKINSKAYA via KOZITSKIY Pereulok. Walk on right side of street. Window-shop in vegetable-fruit store which is next to site (House 2, Korpus 8).

2. Determine type of installation where telephone is located.

3. Is telephone (and signal site) visible from sidewalk? Are there windows on ground floor level?

4. Would a Westerner have normal access in terms of using telephone or is telephone so hidden that passersby would never be aware of its existence? Are there any written signs or overt indications that there is a telephone booth in this location?

5. Observe any taxi stands or possible fixed surveillance/observation points near this building.

6. Notice if any people are loitering near entrance to building or situated across the street.

7. If you can observe interior through window or open door as you pass by, describe in detail interior arrangements.

8. Observe type of building(s) opposite (across the street) from signal site.

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4. The advantages of this type of outgoing communication from [REDACTED] is that, if this operation is being mounted by the KGB as a provocation, it puts the opposition in an extremely difficult position in terms of making a positive identification of [REDACTED] and of physically apprehending him. Thus it affords CIA stricter control of the drop and area than heretofore has been possible for internal drop unloading.

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5. It is proposed that [REDACTED] be informed that "our man" will be available, i.e., waiting on the other side of the wall, precisely at 2300 hours (e.g.) on each Saturday for four concurrent weeks. "Our man" will be instructed to be in place at 2255 and remain in place until circa 2305. In the event that something is amiss, "our man" will give a danger signal, e.g., sing or whistle a familiar tune. Moreover, a precise spot along the wall will be located for [REDACTED] to throw the packet.

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6. [REDACTED] will have the option of aborting the proposed action as he passes the drop spot. If the operation is clean, [REDACTED] only security worry will be the presence and/or location of Soviet citizens in the immediate area. However, in the past, this street has been dimly lit and not subject to heavy pedestrian traffic.

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7. Exact details and timing will be worked out upon approval of this operational plan by CSR/9 and the casing and recommendations of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

SR/9

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